Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

5-1-2014

Justice Antonin Scalia: Consistently Orginalist
Christopher Scott Myles

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Myles, Christopher Scott, "Justice Antonin Scalia: Consistently Orginalist" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 543.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/543

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: CONSISTENTLY ORGINALIST
Christopher S. Myles
INTRODUCTION

Throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia has been applauded
and criticized as a crusader for political conservatives. 1 Critics often accuse Justice Scalia of
allowing his personal

view~ictate his decisions.

Some argue that after reaching these

predetermined conclusions, Scalia masterfully relies on "originalism" to justify the holding, or
conversely, that he abandons his constitutional principles when they clash with his beliefs?
Section I of this paper examines Justice Scalia's background and details the events that led to his
appointment to the Supreme Court. Section II explains originalism and how Justice Scalia
applies this methodology of constitutional interpretation throughout his cases. Finally, Section
III analyzes several of Justice Scalia's opinions in the areas of Free Speech, 3 Separation of
Powers, the Establishment Clause and Criminal Procedure and contrasts them with his
background, ideology and judicial philosophy. As discussed infra, although Justice Scalia has
strong personal views about religion, strong executive power and traditional American values,
this paper seeks to show that Justice Scalia's opinions appear to be predominantly driven by
originalism rather than his personal beliefs. 4

1

Jeffrey Rosen, A Man ofInfluence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/20 10/0 1103/books/review/Rosen-t.html.
2
See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA (2009).
3
The free speech analysis is limited to the rights of corporations as decided in Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Com 'n, 558 U.S. 310 (20 10).
4
The author admits that this conclusion is limited to the areas of Free Speech, Separation of Powers, Establishment
Clause and Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the author recognizes that critics have set forth plausible criticisms
that Scalia's methodology allows him to reach conclusions that support his ideological beliefs under the guise of
originalism. However, as discussed infra, Scalia has reached several holdings that contravene his personal beliefs.

1

I.

THE ROAD TO THE SUPREME COURT

Justice Antonin Scalia was born during Lent on March 11, 1936 in Trenton, New Jersey. 5
His father Salvatore was an immigrant from Sicily who came to the United States at age 17. 6 His
mother Catherine was born only two years after her parents immigrated to the United States from
Italy. 7 Catherine and Salvatore, who were married in 1929, both valued religion and education. 8
At the time of their marriage, Catherine taught elementary school and Salvatore commuted
between Trenton and New York City where he worked as a research assistant while he pursued
his Ph.D. at Columbia University. 9 In 1934, Salvatore received an Italian-American fellowship
that allowed him to study abroad at the University of Rome and University of Florence. 10 It was
in Florence, during the summer of 1935, that Salvatore and Catherine learned that she was
pregnant.
Shortly after Scalia was born, Salvatore accepted a job as an instructor in the Romance
languages department at Brooklyn College. 11 However, the Scalias continued to reside in the
tight-knit Italian neighborhoods of Trenton. During this time the family moved often, and lived
with family members and friends. During Scalia's early childhood in Trenton, he was constantly
surrounded by family who valued the traditions of Catholicism as well as education. 12 Finally,
when Antonin was six years old the Scalia's moved to Queens, New York. This was the first
time that the Scalias did not share a home with other families. The family home in Queens was
filled with books and Catherine instilled in Scalia the importance of education at a young age. In
Queens, Antonin attended elementary school at Public School13. However, he was actively
5

BISKUPIC, supra note 2, p. 11.
I d. at p. 13.
7
I d. at p. 11.
8
ld. at p. 14.
6

9

ld. at p. 14.
ld. at p. 14.
11
Id. atp. 15.
12
I d. at pp. 12-5.
10
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involved with religion and Antonin would leave school early each Wednesday to attend tp'
Catholic education classes. 13
When Antonin completed eighth grade, he obtained a scholarship to attend Xavier High
School, a Jesuit school in Manhattan. 14 During his time at Xavier, Scalia participated in ROTC
and performed military drills after school at the nearby armory; he proudly recalls carrying his
rifle with him on the subway. 15 The four years spent at Xavier provided Scalia with discipline,
"academic prowess," a high regard for Catholicism, and helped form~his conservative ideals. 16
Scalia explained that he seriously considered becoming a priest after graduating from Xavier. 17
However, after graduating first in his class from Xavier in 1953, Scalia decided to attend college
at Georgetown University. In 1957, Scalia graduated summa cum laude and received a Bachelor
of Arts degree in History. As valedictorian, Scalia gave a speech to the graduating class which
revealed his views about the influence of Catholicism in daily life. Scalia remarked, "If we will
not be leaders of a real, a true, a Catholic intellectual life, no one will." 18
From Georgetown, Scalia went to Harvard Law School. At Harvard, Scalia was the
Notes Editor for the Harvard Law Review and graduated magna cum laude in 1960. While at
Harvard, Scalia met Maureen McCarthy who was an undergraduate at Radcliffe College. The
two met on a blind date that was arranged by a mutual friend who believed "the two Catholics in
Cambridge would naturally like each other." 19 Maureen fell for Scalia quickly and the two were
married shortly after graduation in 1960. 20 As Scalia recalls, "we were both devout Catholics.
That was perhaps the most important thing we had in common. And being devout Catholic
13

ld. at pp. 17-9.
Id. at p. 21.
15
I d. at pp. 21-2.
16
Id., at p. 21.
17
ld., at p. 28.
18
I d. at p. 26.
19
I d. at p. 30.
zo Id.
14

3

means you have children when God gives them to you, and you raise them."21 Eventually, Scalia
and Maureen would have nine children together.
In 1961, Scalia took a job as an attorney in Cleveland, Ohio at the law firm of Jones, Day,
Cockley and Reavis. 22 He left the firm in 1967 for a job as a Law Professor at the University of
Virginia.

23

After four years of teaching, President Nixon appointed him general counsel for the

Office of Telecommunications. In his role as general counsel, Scalia spent much of his time
drafting federal policy for cable television. In mid-1974, Nixon nominated Scalia as Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel. Shortly after Nixon's resignation, President
Ford continued the nomination and Scalia was confirmed on August 22, 1974.
As an Assistant Attorney General in the aftermath of Watergate, Scalia spent a lot of time
testifying before congressional committees. He constantly defended the Ford administration by
refusing to tum over documents on the basis of executive privilege. 24 It was also during the Ford
Administration that Scalia argued his first, and only, case before the Supreme Court. Advocating
for thetp:ernment on behalf ofDunhill in the case of Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc. v. Republic
ofCuba:\scalia's position was successful.
After Ford lost the election to President Carter, Scalia worked for the American
Enterprise Institute for several months before taking a job at the University of Chicago Law
School from 1977 to 1982. While at the University of Chicago, Scalia became the first faculty
adviser to the University of Chicago's chapter of the Federalist Society.
When President Reagan was elected in 1980, Scalia interviewed for the position of
Solicitor General but he was unsuccessful. Subsequently, he was offered a position on the Court

21
22

!d., at pp. 30-1.
I d. at pp 31-2.

23

Id.

24

I d. at pp. 42-44.
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1982. However, Scalia declined hoping he would be
nominated for a seat on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit"). The
declination worked in Scalia's favor as he was offered a position on the D.C. Circuit later that
year. Scalia accepted and was confirmed by the senate and sworn in on August 17, 1982.
During his tenure on the D.C. Circuit, Scalia was noted for his writing ability. He also
drew the attention of the Reagan administration who liked his conservative opinions and
criticisms of the Burger Court. In 1986, after Chief Justice Burger announced his retirement,
Reagan nominated Justice William Rehnquist to fill the Chief Justice's seat. Reagan decided to
nominate Scalia to fill Rehnquist's previous seat. Scalia gladly accepted the nomination.
During Scalia's confirmation hearings, he stated: "I assure you, I have no agenda. I am
not going onto the Court with a list of things that I want to do. My only agenda is to be a good
judge."25 On September 17, 1986, Scalia was confirmed by the Senate in a vote of98-0. On this
date, he became the 103rd Justice of the Supreme Court and the first Italian-American on the
Supreme Court.
Ill.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AN 0RIGINALIST

"I do not think the Constitution, or any text should be interpreted either strictly or
sloppily; it should be interpreted reasonably." 26 Justice Scalia uses a methodology to statutory
and Constitutional interpretation known as "originalism." Originalists believe that the
Constitution should be interpreted to "mean what it meant when it was adopted."

27

In other

words, if the text of a Constitutional provision is ambiguous Scalia will look toward the writings
of the Framers to determine what the words of the provision meant when they were adopted in

25
26
27

Id, at p. 113.
Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech to Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005).
supra n. 2, p. 4.

BISKUPIC,

5

the eighteenth-century.

28

Scalia explains that his "manner of interpreting the Constitution is to

begin with the text, and to give that text the meaning that it bore when it was adopted by the
people."

29

However, the methodology of originalism differs from that of"original intent."

Although judges that are guided by "original intent" review similar, if not the same, writings as
originalists, proponents of original intent use these documents to interpret the provision based on

°

what they subjectively believe the Framers sought to accomplish. 3 Conversely, proponents of
original meaning will analyze the writings of the Framers as well as other relevant historical
documents to understand what the most informed people of the time believed the text to mean.
Scalia believes that the words should be interpreted in their plain meaning at the time of
adoption; i.e., in order to understand the provision, one must identify what the words meant to
the drafter. 31 In other words, interpretation should be guided by the original meaning of the text,
not the intent of the drafters.
To do determine original meaning, Justice Scalia often relies on dictionaries from the
time the text was drafted in order to ascertain the original understanding of the word at the time
the provision was drafted. 32 For example, in Arts v. Finley, 33 Justice Scalia used a dictionary
from 1776 to define the term "abridging" in order to determine if a statute violated the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. 34

2s Id.
29

ld.

30

KEVIN A. RING, SCALIA DISSENTS 6-9 (2004).
I d.; see also, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com 'n, 558 U.S. 310, 385-86 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(criticizing Justice Stevens for ignoring the meaning of the text an~ying on the Framers' personal views to
determine that they did not intend for the First Amendment to apply 1\orporations).
32
See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 966, 972-73 (1999) '(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary to determine the customary meaning of intent); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,410 (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (citing Webster's Dictionary for the meaning of "representatives").
33
Arts v. Finley, 524 US. 569 (1998)
34
See, Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment); U.S.
CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances")
31

6

In defense of his originalist approach, Scalia has argued that his personal views do not
influence his opinions. In a speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Scalia explained:
You see, I have my rules that confine me. I know what I'm looking for. When I
find it- the original meaning of the Constitution - I am handcuffed. If I believe
that the First Amendment meant when it was adopted that you are entitled to bum
the American flag, I have to come out that way even though I don't like to come
out that way. When I find that the original meaning of the jury trial guarantee is
that any additional time you spend in prison which depends upon a fact must
depend upon a fact found by a jury- once I find that's what the jury trial
guarantee means, I am handcuffed. Though I'm a law-and-order type, I cannot do
all the mean conservative things I would like to do to this society. You got me. 35
Scalia makes a compelling argument that can be supported by many of his opinions in the Fourth

. w7_

Amendment area. It is unlikely to believe,

as~~d political conservative, that Justice

Scalia would personally favor many of the rights his Constitutional interpretation affords
criminal suspects. Additionally, as a political conservative it is unlikely that he would argue~
against regulation of punitive damage awards. 36
Additionally, Scalia is skeptical of legislative intent for two reasons. First, he argues that
legislative intent is unreliable because it is not always unitary. 37 In situations where it is
impossible to ascertain a singular intent of the drafters, it is likewise impossible to attribute
singular intent to the law. Second, Scalia firmly believes that legislative intent is illegitimate and
that "we are governed by laws, not the intentions of the legislature." 38
In addition to his traditionalist approach, Scalia is also a federalist and a judicial
conservative. 39 He believes in a strict separation of powers between the branches of
government. To Scalia, separation of powers and federalism are more important to protecting
35

Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech to Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005)
See e.g., B.M W. ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
37
RING, supra n. 30, pp. 8, 24-5.
36

38
39

Id.
Id. at pp. 8-9.
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individual liberties than the Bill ofRights. 40 Accordingly, Scalia believes that judges should
exercise judicial restraint and avoid legislating from the bench. 41 This coincides with Scalia's
view that the Constitution is not a living document. In his view, interpreting the Constitution as
a living document gives judges too much power and allows them to make determinations as to
which rights are valued by the public and which rights can be discarded. 42

IV. JUSTICE SCALIA'S SEARCH FOR ORIGINAL MEANING AS EVIDENCED BY HIS OPINIONS
A. ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part,
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " 43 Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission/ 4 is a prime
example of his disdain for the method of interpretation based on original intent. 45 In Citizens

United, the Court held, inter alia, that a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 ("BCRA") violated the First Amendment because it restricted political speech by
corporations and barred independent corporate expenditures for electioneering
communications. 46 Although Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court, he wrote a
concurring opinion to address the dissent's argument related to the original meaning of the First
Amendment. 47 As previously indicated, Justice Scalia employs originalism, a method of
interpretation that requires an analysis of the original meaning of the text, to interpret

40

See generally, id. at pp. 43-6.
!d.
42
See id. at pp. 6-8; see also, Justice Antonin Scalia, Speech to Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
(Mar. 14, 2005).
43
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com 'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) [hereinafter, Citizens United].
45
See id. at 385-86 (Scalia, J. concurring)
46
!d. at 311.
47
Scalia's concurring opinion is in response to Section Ill( I) of Justice Stevens' dissent titled, "Original
Understandings." See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 425 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
41

8

constitutional provisions.

48

In his concurrence, Scalia criticizes the dissent for reasoning that the

Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, as it applies to free speech, was unsupported by
the original understanding of the Constitution. 49 Scalia explains that Justice Stevens' dissent,
which argued that the First Amendment does not extend free speech protections to corporations,
is flawed because it fails to provide evidence that the text of the First Amendment could not
apply to a corporation. To Scalia, the dissent mistakenly focuses on the Framers' personal
distaste for corporations in order to conclude that corporations were not entitled to exercise free
speech. For example, Scalia summarizes the dissents position as, "the Framers didn't like
corporations ... and therefore it follows (as night the day) that corporations had no rights of free
speech." 50 He explains that the reasoning is flawed because the dissent's original understanding
argument fails to address the original meaning of the actual text. 51 Scalia states, "[o]f course the
Framers' personal affection or disaffection for corporations is relevant only insofar as it can be
thought to be reflected in the understood meaning of the text they enacted - not, as the dissent
suggests as a free standing substitute for that text. " 52 He suggests that when dealing with a
constitutional text that does not distinguish between speakers, the proper analysis would be to
cite statements from the founding era that show corporations are not covered by the text.

53

Conversely, to support his position that the First Amendment was originally meant to apply to
corporations, Scalia used historical examples of colonial corporations exercising their First
Amendment freedoms. Scalia writes, "[:fJor example: An antislavery Quaker corporation
petitioned the First Congress, distributed pamphlets, and communicated through the press in

48

See RING, supra n. 30, pp. 6-9.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 385 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
50
!d. at 386.
51 !d.
52
!d. at 386.
53 !d.
49

9

1790.

54

Furthermore, he cites additional historical evidence to show that the freedom of the

press, a textually similar clause, was understood to protect the publishing activities of editors and
printers that acted through newspapers, which Scalia analogizes to modem-day corporations. 55
Ultimately, Justice Scalia concludes that the original meaning of the First
Amendment protects corporate speech because it is written in terms of "speech" and not in terms
of "speakers." 56 He states there is no evidence to suggest that the text excludes any category of
speaker. 57

B.

SCALIA'S 0RIGINALIST APPROACH TO SEPARATION OF POWERS OFTEN
RESULTS IN CONSISTENT FORMALIST OUTCOMES

Justice Scalia's jurisprudence in the separation of powers cases has become predictably
consistent based on his formalist approach to the three branches of government and his
originalist method of interpretation. Articles I, II, and II of the Constitution created three
separate branches of federal government: the legislative, executive and judiciary. When
interpreting the relationship or balance of power between these branches, most judges either take
a formalist or functionalist approach. Justice Scalia's use of originalism routinely produces
results that are formalist in the sense that they consistently interpret the Constitution as creating
distinct separation of power between each branch of government. 58 Like most formalists, Justice
Scalia believes that the Constitution draws clear lines and separates power between each branch
of government. Accordingly, the Constitution assigns different powers to the executive,

54
55
56
57

Id.

ld. at 390.
Id.

Id. at 392-93.

58

See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Constitution forbids Congress to interfere with
courts' final judgments and thus, the statute violated the Constitution's separation of powers); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361,413 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Promulgation of sentencing guidelines is a lawmaking
function and Congress violated separation of powers when they delegated that power to the United States
Sentencing Commission).

10

legislative and judiciary and it does not allow these branches to share authority. Scalia's
approach to interpreting the clear meaning of the Constitution has put him at odds with other
members of the Court who embrace a more pragmatic, functionalist approach to separation of
powers. Unlike formalists who draw sharp lines and build high-walls, functionalists use a
"checks and balances" approach to provide for greater flexibility between the three branches. 59
Functionalists often look at the balance of power between the branches and then determine if one
branch has usurped too much power from another. 60 Scalia openly opposes the functionalist
approach to power between the branches. In his words, "[ s]eparation of powers, a distinctively
American political doctrine, profits from the advice authored by a distinctively American poet:
Good fences make good neighbors. " 61
Scalia's views toward separation of power are not surprising given his jurisprudential
approach of original meaning and his professional background. First, Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution reads: "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. " 62 In order to interpret this provision, Scalia looks at the plain meaning of the text. As
he explains, this provision "does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive
power." 63 Second, Scalia's actions during his position as Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel indicates that he firmly believes in strict separation of power in order to
preserve the autonomy of the executive branch. For example, as Assistant Attorney General
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Scalia often invoked "executive privilege" and
refused to provide Congress with documents related to the Watergate Scandal. 64 Furthermore,

59

William Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation ofPowers Cases, 22
HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 21,21-3 (1998).
60
!d. at p. 21-2.
61
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. at 240 (quoting Robert Frost).
62
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1
63
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original); see infra at??
64
BISKUPIC, supra n. 2, pp. 42-4.
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when a bill was passed by Congress to amend the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") which
would have increased the scope of FO IA, Scalia advocated for President Ford to exercise his
veto power.

65

Scalia viewed the bill as a further intrusion on executive authority and he

successfully persuaded Ford to veto the bill, however, the veto was overridden by Congress. 66
Given Justice Scalia's originalist methodology and the positions he took, as a member of the
executive branch, to thwart the legislative branch from infringing on executive privilege, it not
surprising that his opinions in Morison, 67 Mistretta 68 and Plaul9 emphasize a strict separation of
power between all three branches of government.
1. MORRISON V. 0LSON 70 AND THE USURPATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
ACCORDING TO JUSTICE SCALIA

Up until 1978, investigations into the wrongdoings of executive officials were carried out
by a "special prosecutor" who was appointed by the attorney general. 71 The special prosecutor
was a position that could be terminable at will by the attorney general. During Watergate, 72
Archibald Cox was appointed by Attorney General Elliot Richardson as a special prosecutor
assigned to investigate the Nixon administration's involvement in the break-in of the Democratic
National Committee headquarters. 73 During the investigation, Cox learned that President Nixon
used a secret taping system in the White House. Subsequently, Cox obtained a grand jury

65

BISKUPIC, supra n. 2, pp. 45-7.
Id.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
68
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Promulgation of sentencing guidelines
is a lawmaking function and Congress violated separation of powers when they delegated that power to the United
States Sentencing Commission)
69
Plautv. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)
70
This case is given a longer analysis then some of the other cases because the author believes that it clearly
demonstrates Justice Scalia's method of analysis and use oftextualism.
71
BISKUPIC, supra n. 2, 42-7.
72
"Watergate" refers to the political scandal surrounding the break-in at the Democratic National Committee
headquarters at the Watergate office in Washington, D.C. and the Nixon administration's attempted cover-up of it's
involvement.
73
BISKUPIC, supra n. 2, 42-7.
66
67
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subpoena ordering Nixon to produce the recordings. However, Nixon refused and asserted that
executive privilege allowed him to withhold the tapes. In October 1973, Nixon ordered the
attorney general to terminate Cox as the special prosecutor. This dismissal led Congress to pass
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 ("Ethics Act"). 74 The law allowed a "special court" to
appoint an independent counsel upon the recommendation of the attorney general. 75 This new
independent counsel could only be removed by the attorney general upon a showing of "good
cause." 76
The constitutionality of the independent counsel came before the Supreme Court in 1988
in the case of Morrison v. Olson. 77 Prior to the case reaching the Court, the House Judiciary
Committee had begun an investigation into the Justice Department's role in a controversy
between the House of Representatives ("House") and the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"). 78 Specifically, the Judiciary Committee had found that Olson, and other officials in the
attorney general's office, had given false testimony during an EPA investigation. Additionally,
they found that two other officials in the attorney general's office, Schmults and Dinkins, had
obstructed the investigation by withholding documents. 79 Consequently, the Special Division80
appointed Morrison to investigate the allegations against Olson only but gave her jurisdiction to
investigate whether Olson's testimony or any other matter related thereto violated federallaw. 81
Eventually, a dispute arose between Morrison and the Attorney General regarding the scope of

74

RING, supra n. 30, p . 44-5.
!d.
76 !d.
77
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
78
!d. at 654.
79 !d.
80
The "Special Division" was a special court that was created by the Ethics in Government Act. In accordance with
the procedures set forth in the Act, the Judiciary Committee provided their report to the Attorney General and
requested that he seek appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the allegations against Olson and the
other officials, Schmults and Dinkins. See, id.
81 /d.
15

13

Morrison's jurisdiction and whether the independent counsel was given the power to investigate
the other officials in the attorney general's office. 82 After the Special Division ruled that
Morrison had jurisdiction to investigate whether Olson had conspired with other officials, she
issued grand jury subpoenas to Schmults and Dinkins. 83 In response, Olson, Schmults and
Dinkins made a motion to quash the subpoenas arguing that the independent counsel provisions
were unconstitutional. 84 The District Court for the District of Columbia found the Act was
constitutional and refused to quash the subpoenas. However, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower
court and found that the provisions violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 85
The majority in Morrison, used a functional approach to hold that the independent
counsel provision of the Ethics Act did not violate the separation of powers principles of the
Constitution. The Court explained that Article II of the Constitution vests executive power in the
President which is extended to grant the President the power to appoint and remove "inferior
officers." 86 Additionally, the independent counsel was an inferior officer with limited
jurisdiction that could be terminated by the President (through the attorney general) for
misconduct. The Court reasoned that the Act did not involve an attempt by Congress to increase
its own powers at the expense of the executive branch. Additionally, by limiting the President's
removal power to a showing of good cause, the Ethics Act did not undermine the President's
ability to perform executive functions, nor did it allow the judiciary to usurp executive power. 87
In sum, the President's executive power was not impaired by the appointment of the independent
counsel.

82
83

/d.
/d.

84
85

/d.
!d. at 654-55.

86

Id at 655.
/d.

87
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Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison is a clear example of his formalist view that the
Constitution establishes clear lines and separation of power between the three branches of
government. Scalia dissented in Morrison on the basis that the Ethics Act was a violation of the
Constitution's separation of powers. Specifically, he explained that criminal prosecution is an
exercise of purely executive power and the appointment of the independent prosecutor deprived
the President of exclusive control of that power. However, Scalia's opinion makes clear that he
believes the implications of the majority's decision goes far beyond the facts of this case; to
Scalia, the decision attacks the fundamental liberty that the Constitution was drafted to protect.
In a long and passionate dissenting opinion, Scalia expresses dissatisfaction with the Court's
functionalist approach to "balancing" powers between the branches. 88 Moreover, he criticizes the
majority for focusing too much analysis on the technical details of the Appointments Clause and
the removal power. 89 • 90
Scalia uses a regimented, step-by-step analysis to determine if the Ethics Act is
unconstitutional. First, he looks at the text of the Constitution to determine which powers are
granted to the executive. Next, he looks at the text of the Ethics Act to assess the powers given
to the independent counsel. Finally, he determines if these powers conflict with those
exclusively granted to the President. At the offset, Scalia states that the Ethics Act must be
invalidated based on separation of powers principles if the Court determines that (1) the conduct
88
89

!d. at 711-12.
ld at 703.

90

Additionally, Scalia argues that creation of independent counsel is a product of a political power struggle between
the legislative and executive branches. He discusses at length the political motivations and dangers that can arise
through the appointment of independent counsel. For example, Scalia suggests that the independent counsel can be
used as a tool by Congress to weaken the President and erode public support. He is skeptical about future uses of
the independent counsel. Although this portion of Scalia's opinion has been omitted from my analysis, it is worth
noting that Scalia's fears were felt by republicans and democrats alike prior to the 1992 election when an
independent counsel leaked documents that suggested President Bush (then running for reelection) had lied
regarding the Iran-Contra affair and during President Clinton's presidency when the independent counsel
investigated Clinton's extramarital relationships and suspect land deals that led to his impeachment by the House of
Representatives. See, Ring, supra, p. 4 7.

15

of a criminal prosecution is the exercise of purely executive power, and (2) the statute deprives
the President of exclusive control over the exercise of that power. 91
In accordance with his originalist approach to interpretation, Scalia began his analysis by
looking at the principle of separation of powers enumerated in the text of the first sections of
Articles I, II and III of the Constitution. 92 Scalia explains that the framers created separate
branches of government in order to prevent a concentration of power in one department. For
support, he cites the writings of framers James Madison and Alexander Hamilton:
"[t]he Framers of the Federal Constitution similarly viewed the principle of
separation of powers as the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government. In
No. 47 of The Federalist, Madison wrote that '[n]o political truth is certainly of
greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty."' 93
Scalia believes, "[w ]ithout a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights would be
worthless, as are the bills of rights of many nations of the world that have adopted, or even
improved upon, the mere words of ours. " 94
Next, Scalia focuses his analysis on the language of Article II and the powers granted to
the executive branch. As Scalia reiterates throughout his dissent, Article II states, "[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States."95 Scalia, relying on plain
meaning, argues that the Constitution "does not mean some of the executive power, but all ofthe
executive power." 96 He then explains that criminal prosecution is a purely executive power.
To determine if the statute violates separation of powers, Scalia's analysis moves to the
powers given to the independent counsel. He explains that the independent counsel is "vested
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ld. at
See Id. at 697-98.
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Jd. (emphasis in original).
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with the 'full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the Department of Justice [and] the Attorney General. "'97 Additionally,
the independent counsel may only be removed by a showing of good cause. In accordance with
his original meaning philosophy, Scalia looks to the House Reports to determine the meaning of
"good cause." In doing so, he explains that Congress meant the term "good cause" to be a
limitation "protecting the independent counsel's ability to act independently of the President's
direct control since it permits removal only for misconduct. " 98
To complete the analysis, Scalia finds that criminal prosecution is a purely executive
function and thus the power granted to independent prosecutor infringes upon that power.
Moreover, since the "good cause" limitation was meant to, and does, deprive the President of
exclusive control of that power.
Scalia's dissent in Morrison is a prime example of his use of textualism to determine if a
statute is Consitutional. Here, Scalia looked at the text and writings of the drafters of the
Constitution to determine the exclusive powers granted to the executive branch. Subsequently,
he looked at the text of the statute and the writings of Congress to determine the original
meaning. Finally, he compared the powers given by each and concluded that the statute granted
powers that were non-delegable by the Constitution. Some critics would argue that Scalia came
to this conclusion based on his background as an assistant attorney general and his prior
assertions of executive privilege. However, Scalia's opinion in Morrison appears to be entirely
consistent with his jurisprudential approach to plain meaning and originalism.

97
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Id. at 706. (quoting, 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)) (emphasis in original).
Jd. at 707 (citing, H.R. Conf. Rep. 100-452, p. 37 (1987))

17

2. MISTRETTA V. UNITED STATES: 99 SCALIA TAKES ISSUE WITH THE
CREATION OF A "JUNIOR VARSITY CONGRESS"

Shortly after the decision in Morrison, the Court was faced with another separation of
powers case. In Mistretta v. United States, 100 the Court was asked to consider the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA"). 101 Specifically, the Court was
asked to determine if Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine of the Constitution by
delegating the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense to
the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), an independent sentencing
commission. 102 In an 8-1 decision, the Court found that the Sentencing Guidelines were
constitutional. The majority's opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, held that Congress
"neither delegated excessive legislative power [to the Commission] nor upset the constitutionally
mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches." 103 Specifically, the Court
reasoned that the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from delegating the task of
determining sentencing guidelines to an expert body in the judicial branch. 104 Justice Scalia, the
lone dissenter, disagreed with the majority and argued that the issuance of guidelines was a
lawmaking function that could not be delegated by Congress. 105
In his dissent, Scalia once again analyzes the meaning of the challenged statute. He starts
his analysis by looking at the role of the sentencing guidelines. To Scalia, the act of drafting
sentencing guidelines is equivalent to drafting law because judges are bound to their restrictions
99

488 U.S. 361 (1989) (hereinafter, Mistretta).
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The SRA established the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") within the judicial branch.
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be Federal Judges. The Commission must promulgate determinative sentencing guidelines which are binding on the
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Id. at 371.
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Id. at 412.
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and can be overturned if they fail to abide by them. Scalia acknowledges that Congress may
create advisory committees to assist them with their functions. 106 The constitutional problems
arise when that agency is granted power. Similar to his analysis in Morrison, Scalia analyzes the
text of Articles I, II and III of the Constitution. He distinguishes the language in Article I, that

"all legislative Powers shall be vested in Congress," from the language of Article III, "the
executive Power shall be vested in the President .... " Specifically, Scalia interprets the
language and historical meaning to suggest that although the President may employ agencies to
carry out executive functions, the legislative and judicial branches may not. By way of example,
Scalia writes, "a judge may not leave the decision to his law clerk" and "Senators and Members
of the House may not send delegates to consider and vote upon bills in their place" 107 He
describes the Commission as "an independent agency exercising governmental power on behalf
of a Branch where all governmental power is supposed to be exercised personally by the judges
of courts." 108 Even more critical, Scalia points out that allowing the judiciary to appoint
independent agency to fix sentencing previously exercised by district courts could lead to
independent agencies that adopt rules of procedure and evidence -both purely judicial powers.
Following his typical framework of analysis, Scalia invokes the writings of the Framers
of the Constitution to defend his position. He criticizes the majority for treating the Constitution
as a mere "generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches should not be commingled
too much" and their position that the Court should be the ultimate arbiter of "how much is too
much" on a case-by-case basis. 109 He argues that the Framers already determined how much
commingling was acceptable and documented it in the Constitution. To set forth original

Id.
Id. at 682.
108
Id. at 682.
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Id. at 682-83.
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meaning, Scalia quotes James Madison's explanation that separation of powers "[d]oes not mean
that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of
each other." Although Scalia admits that the majority correctly cited this quote in their opinion,
he argues that they improperly interpreted it. Scalia states that the meaning of Madison's
statement was that "the commingling specifically provided for in the structure that he and his
colleagues had designed- the Presidential veto over legislation, the Senate's ratification of
treaties, the Congress' power to impeach and remove executive and judicial officers - did not
violate a proper understanding of separation of powers." 110 It is clear that Scalia believes the
Court is mistaken. He states that the Court places too much focus on their comingling analysis
and fails to realize that the Constitution does not allow for a body that is not the Congress to
make rules that have the effect of laws. To Scalia, the creation of the Commission was
equivalent to the creation of another branch of government- a junior varsity Congress.

111

Scalia's opinion in Mistretta is not a surprising result given his dissent in Morrison a year
earlier. Following his textualist approach to separation of powers, Scalia is once again
disappointed with the Court for taking a pragmatic approach to balancing the powers between the
branches and ultimately concluding that Congress' delegation of power to the Commission was
Constitutional because it was not excessive. To Scalia, the Constitution provides rules, not
guidelines, which create exclusive powers to be exercised by each branch. As he points out, the
Commission is not one of the three branches of government and "the only governmental power
the Commission possesses is the power to make law; and it is not the Congress."

110
Ill
112
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3. FINALLY IN THE MAJORITY: PLAUT V. SPENDTHRIFT FARM, INC.

Consistent with his prior dissents advocating a strict separation of powers, Scalia wrote
the majority opinion in the 1995 case of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 113 In Plaut, the Court
held that Section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter, "1934 Act"),
which required federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment, was
unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers. Justice Scalia's analysis was
consistent with his previous separation of powers cases as he methodically addressed the
language of the Constitution and relied upon the writings of the Framers to assess the original
meaning of the text.
In Plaut, the question presented to the Court was whether § 27 A(b) of the 1934 Act, to
the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments in private civil actions,
contravenes the Constitution's separation of powers.

114115

Prior to reaching the Supreme Court,

this case was dismissed as time-barred following the Court's decision in Lampf, 116 which
established a national statute of limitations standard for cases brought under § 1O(b) of the 1934
Act of "one year after the discovery of facts constituting the violation and within three years after
such violation " 117 In response to the Court's decision in Lampf, Congress passed Section 27A 118
of the 1934 Act. The statute provided, inter alia, that civil actions brought under § 1O(b) that
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See Plaut, 514 U.S. 211.
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118
Section 27A of the 1934 Act was originally signed into law on December 19, 1991, approximately six months
after the Lamp/ decision as Section 4 7 6 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
This section, which became § 27 A of the 1934 Act was unrelated to FDIC improvements. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at
215.
114

21

were commenced prior to June 19, 1991 119 shall be subject to the limitation period provided by
the laws of the applicable jurisdiction, including principles ofretroactivity. 120 Additionally, it
allowed actions that were dismissed as time-barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, which would
otherwise have been timely filed under the limitation period of the applicable jurisdiction to be
"reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 1991. " 121
Following the enactment of§ 27 A, Petitioners filed a motion with the district court to reinstate
their case. The district court found that Petitioners met the conditions set forth in the statute but
nonetheless denied their motion on the grounds that § 27 A(b) was unconstitutional.
Writing for the majority, Scalia seizes the opportunity to reiterate and solidify his
Constitutional interpretation of a strict separation of powers between the three branches of
government that he conveyed in his dissenting opinions in Morrison and Mistretta. Interestingly,
Scalia's analysis and reasoning is almost entirely based on separation of powers principles which
he believes to be "the narrower ground for adjudication of the constitutional questions in the
case;" he only briefly addresses the due process challenge. 122 This is not surprising in light of
Scalia's previous position on the dissenting end of the Court's separation of powers cases. His
opinion, analysis and reasoning throughout the Plaut opinion appears is entirely consistent with
his prior separation of powers opinions. In Plaut, Scalia clarifies that the doctrine of separation
of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm
can be identified. 123 He explains that the separation of powers doctrine is a "prophylactic
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device" that established "high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague
distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict." 124
Like his dissenting opinions in Morrison and Mistretta, Scalia began his analysis in Plaut
by dissecting the language of the statute. Following his usual analytical framework, Scalia
started his analysis by looking at the language of Section 27 A(b) to determine the statute's plain
meaning. Finding the text unambiguous, Scalia explained that the statute retroactively
commanded federal courts to reopen final judgments. 125 Next, he examined the text of Article III
of the Constitution, which provides the judicial branch with "the judicial Power of the United
States." 126 Scalia then concludes that Congress, by requiring federal courts to exercise their
judicial power, exceeded its authority "in a manner repugnant to the text, structure and traditions
of Article 111." 127 To support this conclusion, he looks at the historical role of the judiciary,

128

the writings of the Framers, 129 and the historical underpinnings of colonial legislatures that led to
tripartite branches of government with separate and distinct powers.

130

Scalia's search for original meaning in the Plaut analysis is a prime example of
originalism. To support his proposition that the Constitution prevents the legislative branch from
requiring the judiciary to reopen final judgments, Scalia cites "Colonial Censor Reports"

131

from

Massachusetts, Vermont and Pennsylvania. The Censor Reports provided detailed accounts of

124

!d. at 239.
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217-19.
126 !d.
127 !d.
128
See id. at 218 (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the meaning of Article III powers and the role
125

of the judicial branch in government).
129
See e.g., id. at 219-23 (quoting the writings of James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton)
130
See e.g., id. at 219-221 (discussion of colonial legislatures and the Massachusetts, Vermont and Pennsylvania
Counsil of Censor Reports which addressed issues related to judgments vacated by their respective legislatures).
131
In the years leading up to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, some of the individual state constitutions had
created "Councils of Censors" that were required to "report to the people 'whether the legislative and executive
branches of government have assumed to themselves, or exercised, other or greater powers than they [were] entitled
to by the [respective state] Constitution."' !d. at 219-220 (quoting Vermont State Papers 1779-1786, pp. 531, 533
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instances where state legislatures were usurping power from the state judiciary by vacating
judgments of the courts through legislative acts. 132 Scalia argues that it was this type of
legislative interference with judicial power by colonial legislatures that led the Framers to
establish a clear separation between the legislative and judicial branches. After laying the
historical foundation for his interpretation, Scalia concludes the analysis by quoting the writings
of Jefferson, Hamilton and Madison. In each quotation, the respective Framer acknowledged the
problems faced by Colonial judiciaries and their inability to perform judicial functions due to
legislative interference. Scalia argues that this meddling was the reason why the Framers
established an independent judiciary when they drafted Article III. To Scalia, ascertaining the
original meaning of Article III, as it relates to the facts of this case, was relatively simple because
Alexander Hamilton already described it when he wrote, "[a] legislature without exceeding its
province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe
a new rule for future cases. " 133 As Scalia has said in his defense of textualism, who better to
gain insight from in what the text means than the informed people who drafted it.
C. SCALIA AND THE RELIGION CLAUSE CASES

134

Justice Scalia does not hide the fact that religion plays a fundamental role in his life.
Born and raised as a Roman Catholic, Scalia spent most of his early academic life in parochial
school and later attended college at Georgetown, a Roman Catholic college. 135 Additionally,
Scalia has been known to travel great distances to attend more traditional masses at churches he
believes to be more in line with his conservative practice of the religion. As further evidence,

132

Id, at 220.
Id at 222 (quoting the writings of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81, p. 545 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
134
References throughout this paper to the "Religion Clause" or "Religion Clauses" refer to the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
135
See e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REv. 449 (2000); and
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence ofJustice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385 (2000).
133

24

Scalia seriously consider joining the seminary after high school and one of Scalia's sons is a
catholic priest. 136 Critics are quick to point out Scalia's deeply religious personal life. Most
often, they cite to his religious background after pointing out that Scalia has never once found a
law to establish religion and thus, violate the Establishment Clause. 137 Consequently, many
critics of Justice Scalia have used his Religious Clause opinions, especially dissenting opinions,
to argue that he is a judicial activist furthering his own religious agenda. 138 However, as
discussed in more detail below, an analysis of several of Scalia's opinions reveals that his
conclusions on many Religious Clause cases are consistent with his original meaning approach
to textual analysis. Moreover, it could be argued that Scalia's passionate and openly critical
dissents in the Religious Clause cases are instead fueled by his disillusionment by the Court's
selective use of tests to determine challenges to the Establishment Clause which contravenes his
judicial philosophy that the Court should follow clear rules

\<?~nterpretation in order to provide

the public with notice and certainty. 139

1. THE TEXT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment states, inter alia, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "

140

The first portion of the

text, known as the Establishment Clause, 141 has been interpreted by the Court to prevent the
government from establishing a national religion and bar coercive or symbolic government union
with religion. 142 The latter text, known as the Free Exercise Clause, protects the liberty of
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religious practice from government interference. 143 Although government actions are often
challenged in a single case as violating both Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 144 each
clause produces a separate analysis for the Court. 145 In these situations, the Court first examines
whether the government action violated the Establishment Clause. 146 Prior to the Court's
decision in Lee v. Weisman, 147 the Court employed the "Lemon Test," established in the Court's
1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 148 to determine if a statute or government action violated
the Establishment Clause. 149 The Lemon Test consisted of three prongs: (1) the government's
action must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the government's action must not have the
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) the government's action must
not result in an "excessive government entanglement" with religion. Under Lemon, if any one of
these three prongs is violated, the government action violated the Establishment Clause. 150 If the
action did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court moves to the Free Exercises analysis
and analyzes whether the government action overly burdens an individual's right to adhere to his
or her religious customs. 151
However, the Court changed course in their approach to the Establishment Clause
analysis in the 1992 decision of Lee v. Weisman. Here, the majority largely ignored the Lemon
Test and instead held that the government action violated the Establishment Clause because it
subjected students to pressure and coercion.
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2. LEE V. WEISMAN152
In Lee, a student and her father challenged a Rhode Island public school's practice of
inviting members of the clergy to offer an invocation and benediction prayer at the school's
graduation ceremony.

153

Following a nonsectarian invocation and benediction prayer by a Rabbi

at the school's graduation ceremony, the student and father sued the school district and argued
that the prayer amounted to government required participation in religion. 154 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, ignored the Lemon Test and found that the prayer at graduation violated
the Establishment Clause because it resulted in coercion and pressure on non-believing
students.

155

Kennedy wrote, it is the "duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable

conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people." 156
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, dissented in

Lee. 157 Although the heart of his analysis focused on the original meaning, history and tradition
of the Establishment Clause, Scalia's opinion was very critical of Justice Kennedy and the
majority for several additional reasons. First, Scalia attacks the majority for omitting any
reference to history or tradition in their interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In doing so,
he focuses on the inconsistency of Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence. Scalia dramatically
highlights this at the

~by stating that he cannot join the majority opinion, which lacks any

reference to history, because he previously joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in

Allegheny/ 58 which stated that the
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Establishment Clause must be construed in light of the '[g]overnment policies of
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted
part of our political and cultural heritage.' That opinion affirmed that 'the
meaning of the Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings.' It said that ' [a] test for implementing the protections of the
Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate
longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.' 159
Second, in addition to bashing Justice Kennedy for turning his back on his Allegheny analysis,
Scalia alleges that the majority is oblivious to the history and traditions of religious freedoms in
the United States. For support, he cites a myriad of examples from important moments in U.S.
history where the Framers have used prayers during ceremonies. 160 Third, Scalia mocks the
Court's use of the psychological coercion test which he refers to as an "instrument of
destruction" and "bulldozer of its social engineering." 161 Finally, Scalia predicts that the
illogical reasoning employed by the Court had the potential to invoke a battle over the Pledge of
Allegiance's phrase, "under God." 162
Although Scalia's dissent in Lee is filled with harsh criticisms and colorful language that
attacks the majority's reasoning, the crux of his analysis is based on the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause as evidenced by the traditional use of prayer at government ceremonies
and proclamations ranging from the days of George Washington and James Madison to President
George H.W. Bush. 163 It is reasonable for those unfamiliar with Scalia's jurisprudence, to read
his hostile dissent in Lee and opine that Scalia is biased toward right-wing policies of keeping
God in the classroom. However, after closer analysis of Scalia's opinions in the separation of
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powers cases, it becomes clear that the Lee dissent was based on the same methodical analysis of
original meaning.
3. LAMBS CHAPEL

V. CENTER MORICHES UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICr

64

In Lambs Chapel, the Lemon Test once again reemerged as the majority's test for
Establishment Clause violations, despite the Court's failure to use it one-year prior in Lee v.

Weisman. The case reached the Court on a church' challenge to a New York policy that allowed
school facilities to be used for civic and social purposes but prohibited the use by any group for
religious purposes. 165 The majority found that the New York school district's policy violated the
free speech rights of the church. Additionally, the majority also stated that use of the school by
the church would not violate the Establishment Clause. 166 Relying on Lemon, the Court found
that showing films related to family values would not offend any of the three prongs. 167
Concurring in the free speech judgment, Scalia took the opportunity presented by Lambs

Chapel, to emphasize the irrationality of the Court's use of the Lemon test. In an eloquent
fashion, Scalia informs the reader that Lemon has resurfaced by stating, "[l]ike some ghoul in the
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children and school attorneys of Central Moriches Union Free School
District." 168 Once again, Scalia uses a textual approach to reach the conclusion that the church'
use of the school would not violate the Establishment Clause. Looking for the meaning of the
text, Scalia argues that it would be illogical for the Constitution, which gives "religion in
general" preferential treatment through the Free Exercise Clause, to forbid endorsement of
164
165
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168
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religion in genera/.

169

Scalia points out that the Establishment Clause was only meant to prevent

government establishment of a national religion. To bolster this interpretation, Scalia quotes the
Northwest Territory Ordinance that the Framers drafted during the summer of 1789,

__.----·- -2

simultaneous to their drafting of the First Amendment, in which they wrote: "religion, m&.~ality,

"··----------·

and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall be forever encouraged." 170
4. McCREARY COUNTY, KY. v. ACLU OF KY. 171 .1 72
Justice Scalia's passionate dissent in McCreary is one of Scalia's most controversial
decisions in the Establishment Clause progeny. In McCreary County, the majority, led by
Justice Souter, held that public displays of the Ten Commandments at county courthouses
violated the Establishment Clause. Once again relying on the Lemon Test, the Court found that
the government's actions violated the purpose prong. Specifically, the Court found that the
predominant purpose of placing the statues in the courthouses was to advance religion which was
a direct violation of the Establishment Clause.

It is clear from his dissent that Justice Scalia is enraged by the Court's analysis and
reasoning for their interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In the majority opinion, Justice
Souter stated, "[t]he divisiveness of religion in current public life is inescapable ... [t]his is no
time to deny the prudence of understanding the Establishment Clause to require the government
to stay neutral on religious belief, which is reserved for the conscience of the individual."
Consistent with his prior interpretations, Scalia again reiterates that the Establishment Clause
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does not prohibit the government from allowing religious displays in the public forum.
Furthermore, he takes issue with the majority's position that posting the Ten Commandments is
unconstitutional because it favors one religion over another. Scalia concedes that this is a valid
principle if it were applied in situations where public aid or assistance to religion is concerned,
but he argues that the application is much more limited in relation to public acknowledgment of
the Creator. In what appears to be a radical expansion from his previous opinions, Scalia states
that the history and understanding of the Framers was for the Establishment Clause to allow
government to actually favor religion over non-religion. He reaches this conclusion by
determining that the founding fathers allowed "acknowledgment of a single Creator." From
there, he argues that "it is entirely clear from our nation's historical practices that the
Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities,
just as it permits disregard of devout atheists." 173
Scalia's opinion in McCreary appears to be a departure from his previous interpretations
of the Establishment Clause. If so, this should present a conflict with originalism since their
judicial approach is founded on the original meaning of the words in the Constitution. In other
words, Scalia has been consistently citing and interpreting the same writings of the founding
fathers to proclaim the meaning of the Establishment Clause since his early opinions in the mid1980's.
In prior cases, Scalia took the position that the Establishment Clause originally meant that
the government was prohibited from establishing a national church. In Lambs Chapel, Scalia
alluded to the proposition that it would be illogical for the Establishment Clause to mean
government was forbidden from endorsing religion in general. Here, Scalia expands his theory
to a level not previously proffered through his historical analysis and search for the original
173
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meaning of the Establishment Clause. Scalia contends that the Establishment Clause not only
allows for the government to favor religion over nonreligion - it also allows the government to
favor monotheistic religions over polytheistic religions. 174 He argues that "it is entirely clear
from our nation's historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits disregard of devout atheists."
To Scalia history and tradition suggest the Constitution permits the government to favor religion
over non-religion. 175
At first glance, it would appear that Scalia's opinion in McCreary is a departure from his
previous holdings and inconsistent with his original meaning approach to the Establishment
Clause. However, closer analysis of Scalia's other cases and citation to historical tradition
suggests that he has been alluding to his monotheistic favoritism theory all along. For example,
in previous cases, Scalia has cited many speeches given by the Framers which give reference to
"God" or "the Almighty" which would suggest their preference for a monotheistic god. 176

D.

0RIGINALISM APPLIED TO CRIMINAL CASES

Justice Scalia's use oftextualism and original meaning is readily apparent in his opinions
in the area of criminal procedure. Additionally, it is this area of law that makes it most difficult
for critics to argue that his personal opinions influence his judicial outcomes. As Scalia explains,
he searches for the original meaning of the text and "once I find that's what the [language of the
Constitution] means, I am handcuffed. Though I'm a law-and-order type, I cannot do all the
mean conservative things I would like to do to this society." 177 His opinions make it difficult to
label him pro-prosecution or pro-defendant since many are favorable and many are unfavorable
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to criminal defendants. For example, Scalia has consistently limited the rights of police to
conduct warrantless searches and he has vehemently argued that the confrontation clause allows
criminal defendants to confront witnesses in open court in all circumstances. Conversely, Scalia
has found that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual, even as applied to minors and that the
Fifth Amendment does not require suspects to be advised of their Miranda Rights. \
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1.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES

In Kyllo v. United States,

178

the Court held that the warrantless use of thermal imaging

devices to scan a home was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 179 In this
case, government agents suspected that Kyllo was using high-intensity lamps to grow marijuana
in his home. Without a warrant, agents used a thermal-imaging device to scan the home which
uncovered disproportionate amounts of heat, consistent with the use of lamps, present in certain
areas of the house. Based on the thermal imaging, agents were able to obtain a warrant to search
Kyllo's home which uncovered marijuana.
The question before the Court was "whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at
a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes

°

a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 18 For Scalia, the question presented is
not limited to thermal-imaging devices; rather, the Court must broadly address what limits there
are to the use of advancing technologies to shrink the guaranteed privacy. 181 Writing for the
majority, Scalia thought it necessary to take the "long view" of the Constitution to protect all
types of warrantless surveillance of areas that cross the bright-line drawn at the entrance of the
house. He explained, "[w ]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant." 182 Scalia begins the analysis with his usual starting point- the text of the Fourth
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Amendment.

183

From there, he explains the history and tradition of the law of trespass and how

the Court has interpreted the term, "search." Scalia explains that an area is "searched," for
Fourth Amendment purposes, if it is an area that the individual has an expectation of privacy,_j /
in the area that society would recognize as reasonable. The interior of the home is one such area
that is fundamentally protected from a search. Conversely, the exterior of the home is readily
visible to the public and individuals walking on the public streets. Next, Scalia places emphasis
on creating a distinction between ordinary visual surveillance of the exterior of a home and the
use of a sense enhancing device to see into the home. He explains that visual surveillance, which
does not include a physical intrusion, does not constitute a search because it is not shielded from
the public view and the reasonable person wouldn't have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, when a device is used to penetrate these walls the act becomes a search. Scalia argues
that the original meaning of the Constitution was to allow a man to retreat into the safety of his
home. Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment is to be construed in light of what was deemed to be
unreasonable search when it was adopted. Although colonial agents did not have thermal
imaging technology, it is clear that the Framers were concerned with warrantless searches of the
home and technology that allows the government to look inside the home, without physical
intrusion, is nevertheless a warrantless search.
Scalia is criticized by the dissent for creating a bright line in Kyllo. Justice Stevens
points out that under Scalia's holding, the line drawn at the entrance to the house would be
meaningless once the technology was brought into general public use. The dissent also argues
that thermal imaging does not constitute a search because the device measures heat that is
radiating from the external surface of the house. Heat, similar to light and aroma, enters the
183

See id at 31 ("The Fourth Amendment provides that '[the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.'") (quoting, U.S. Const.
am. IV.)

35

public domain once they leave the building. Stevens explains that the thermal imaging device
was "off the wall" surveillance because it did not reveal intimate details of the area within the
home. In response, Scalia attacks the dissent's position as illogical and impractical. He argues
that it is contrary to the goals of creating workable accomodations between the interests of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Under the dissents theory,
there could never be a workable rule for law enforcement officers to determine if their actions
were constitutional. By limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to intimate details, an officer
would not be able to know in advance whether his surveillance picks up intimate details.
Twelve years after the Court handed down the Kyllo decision, the Court was asked to
determine if the use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch, to investigate the contents
of the home, was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 184 In Jardines,
Police brought a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines' front porch. After the dog signaled a positive
alert for narcotics, officers obtained a warrant to conduct a search of the home. The search
revealed marijuana plants and Jardines was charged with drug trafficking offenses.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that investigation was a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Interestingly, Scalia found that the search was
unconstitutional based on property rights 185 and did not address the Katz 186 analysis to determine
whether the officers had violated the homeowner's reasonable expectation ofprivacy.
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end, Scalia justifies his property-based analysis by clarifying that in Katz, the Court simply said

184

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013)
Specifically, the law of trespass.
186
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court addressed whether the governments performed an
unreasonable search by placing an electronic listening device in a public phone booth to listen to the defendant's
conversations. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not simply places and the content a
person seeks to preserve as private, even in a public space, may be protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Katz
test is to determine if the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. In
Katz, the Court found that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy which the government violated.
187
Most Fourth Amendment cases addressing the issue of unreasonable searches
185

36

that property rights were not the sole measure for Fourth Amendment violations. In other words,
although Katz adds to the baseline to address situations where the governmental intrusion is not
physical, it does nothing to prevent property rights from being used when the government does
engage in physical intrusion. 188
Justice Scalia's analysis, not surprisingly, begins with the text. He explains that
information gathered by a physical intrusion is a "search" within the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Scalia adds that the language expressly protects the home. Thus, the
curtilage, areas immediately surrounding and associated with the home, is also protected because
it has been interpreted to be part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Since
Jardines' porch is curtilage, it must follow that it is also protected as being part of the home.
After determines that Jardines' porch is a protected area based on the original meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, he addresses whether or not the officers' conduct constituted an
unlicensed physical intrusion. Scalia lays the foundation of his analysis by examining the history
and tradition of implied licenses. As he explains, a license may be implied from the habits of the
country. Thus, he concedes, an individual who knocks on another's front door is typically not
trespassing. The implicit license permits the visitor to approach the home, knock, wait to be
received, and leave. However, Scalia argues that there is no customary invitation for a police
officer to introduce a trained police dog to explore the area in hopes of discovering incriminating
evidence. He determines that social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him
to conduct a search. Here, the purpose of the officer bringing the drug-sniffing dog on the porch
was to conduct a search. Scalia concludes that since the officers did not have an implied license
to enter the porcn;·there s arch could not have been objectively reasonable.
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Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, believes that Justice Scalia could have reached the
same conclusion by applying the facts of Jardines to the bright-line rule he described in the Kyllo
decision. For the concurring justices, the officers violated Jardines' right to privacy because they
used a device not in the general public use (the trained drug-sniffing dog) to explore the details
of the home that they would not have otherwise discovered without entering.
2. SCALIA AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
One of the best examples of Scalia's approach to original meaning of the Constitution can
be found in his controversial dissenting opinion in Maryland v. Craig. 189 In this case, a child
accused the defendant of sexually abusing her. Because the child was unable to testify in front of
the defendant due to severe emotional trauma, the Court allowed her to testify via closed circuit
television in which the defendant and the jury could see her, but she could not see them. The
defendant was convicted and appealed on the basis that the transmitted testimony violated the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 190 The Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment did not bar the use of the transmitted testimony because the jury could see the
witness' demeanor, the witness was cross-examined by the defense attorney, and the defendant
had an opportunity to test her credibility in front of the jury. 191 The majority found that the
Confrontation Clause only provides a "preference" for face to face in person confrontation which
could be limited to protect sufficiently important interests. 192
In dissent, Scalia slammed the Court for their holding and accused them of subordinating
explicit constitutional text to current favored public policy. He states, "[t]he Sixth Amendment
provides, with unmistakable clarity, that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
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the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him' 193

•••

Because the text of the Sixth

Amendment is clear, and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather than
conform to, current "widespread belief," I respectfully dissent." 194 Scalia criticizes the Court's
reasoning that face to face confrontation is not an indispensable element of the right to confront
one's accusers. He states, "That is rather like saying "we cannot say that being tried before a
jury is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury
trial." 195
Scalia classifies the Court's opinion as anti-textualist and accused them of"cobbling
together scraps of dicta from various cases" that are irrelevant to the issue. 196 (p. 863). He
interprets the text to be clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, he states that the Court's use of
interest-balancing tests are irrelevant and not permitted, "[ w]e are not free to conduct a costbenefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional guarantees, and then to adjust their meaning
to comport with our findings." To Scalia, it is not enough that the Maryland procedure gave the
defendant "virtually" all of the same rights that the Confrontation Clause guarantees. In other
words, under Scalia's textual interpretation, if the procedure does not allow defendant to
-.&:
.
c.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

It is unquestionable that Justice Scalia's life has been heavily influenced by religion,
federalism and political conservatism. However, based on the opinions analyzed above, it
appears that his legal conclusions and opinions are based on his original meaning methodology
to constitutional interpretation. Although some would argue that Scalia uses his religions views
193
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and conservative values to reach his outcomes, close analysis of his opinions suggests that he
reaches consistent conclusions based on his original understanding of the text. Furthermore, his
decisions protecting individuals that burn the American flag, allow minors to purchase violent
video games, allow violent criminal defendants to face their victims, protect drug dealers from
nonintrusive searches and his dissent arguing that the government cannot limit punitive damages
awards are all contrary to his personal beliefs.
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